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1. Introduction
In 2000, Ko et al. [13] proposed a new public key cryptosystem on braid groups
based on the hardness of the conjugacy problem. The foundation of this system
is quite diﬀerent from widely used cryptosystems on number theory, even if there
are some similarities in design. The key exchange scheme on braid groups is
based on the hardness of the Ko-Lee problem which is a Diﬃe-Hellman version
of the conjugacy problem. There are many group key agreement protocol using
Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange [2, 3, 7, 14]. The motivation to the common group
shared key is caused by the growing importance of secure group communications
on open network such as distributed simulation, multi-user games, audio/video
conferencing, interactive chat and collaborative applications of all kinds. In this
paper, we propose the group shared key protocol on braid groups based on the
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hardness Ko-Lee problem. We also provide the authenticated group key agreement
protocol and show the security properties of the scheme.
This paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we give the background of braid groups and computationally hard
problems regarding the conjugacy. Based on the Ko-Lee assumption, we introduce
the 2-party key agreement protocol. In Section 3, we construct the group key
agreement protocol on braid groups based on the hardness Ko-Lee problem and
improve the protocol by authentication. We also prove that the authenticated
protocol is contributory, perfect forward secret, resistant to known key attacks.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we give the basic deﬁnitions of braid groups and discuss some hard
problems on those groups. For more information of braid groups, word problem
and conjugacy problem, refer to the papers [1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10].
For each integer n ¸ 2, the n-braid group Bn is the group generated by
¾1;¾2;¢¢¢ ;¾n¡1 with the relations
(i) ¾i¾j = ¾j¾i where j i ¡ j j¸ 2;
(ii) ¾i¾i+1¾i = ¾i+1¾i¾i+1.
The integer n is called the braid index and each element of Bn is called an
n ¡ braid. An n-braid has the following geometric interpretation: It is a set of
disjoint n-strands all of which are attached to two horizontal bars at the top and
at the bottom such that each strands always heads downward as one walks along
the strand from the top to the bottom. In this geometric interpretation, each
generator ¾i represents the process of swapping the i-th strand with the next one
(with i-th strand going under the (i+1)-th one). Two braids are equivalent if one
can be deformed to the other continuously in the set of braids. Bn is the set of
all equivalence classes of geometric n-braids with a natural group structure. The
multiplication ab of two braids a and b is the braid obtained by positioning a on
the top of b. The identity e is the braid consisting of n straight vertical strands
and the inverse of a is the reﬂection of a with respect to a horizontal line. So ¾¡1
can be obtained from ¾ by switching the over-strand and under-strand.3
We describe some mathematically hard problems in braid groups. We say that
x and y are conjugate if there is an element a such that y = axa¡1. For m < n;Bm
can be considered as a subgroup of Bn generated by ¾1;¾2;¢¢¢ ;¾m¡1.
1. Conjugacy Decision Problem (CDP)
Instance : (x;y) 2 Bn £ Bn such that y = axa¡1 for some a 2 Bn:
Objective : Determine whether x and y are conjugate or not.
2. Conjugacy Search Problem (CSP)
Instance : (x;y) 2 Bn £ Bn such that y = axa¡1 for some a 2 Bn:
Objective : Find b 2 Bn such that y = bxb¡1:
3. Generalized Conjugacy Search Problem (GCSP)
Instance : (x;y) 2 Bn £ Bn such that y = axa¡1 for some a 2 Bm;m · n.
Objective : Find b 2 Bm such that y = bxb¡1:
4. Conjugacy Decomposition Problem (CDP)
Instance : (x;y) 2 Bn £ Bn such that y = axa¡1 for some a 2 Bm;m < n.
Objective : Find b1;b2 2 Bm such that y = b1xb2.
The public key system on braid groups in [13] is based on the generalized con-
jugacy search problem. We consider two subgroups LBl and RBr of Bl+r for some
appropriate pair of integers (l;r). LBl(resp:RBr) is the subgroup of Bl+r consist-
ing of braids made by braiding left l (resp. right r)-strands among l + r strands.
LBl is generated by ¾1;¢¢¢ ;¾l¡1 and RBr is generated by ¾l+1;¢¢¢ ;¾l+r¡1. For
any a 2 LBl and b 2 RBr; ab = ba. We choose a suﬃciently complicated (l + r)-
braid ® 2 Bl+r. Then the following is the one-way function.
f : LBl £ Bl+r ! Bl+r £ Bl+r; f(a;x) = (axa¡1;x):
For a given a pair (a;x), it is easy to compute axa¡1 but the all the known attacks
need exponential time to compute a from (axa¡1;x). This one way function is
based on the diﬃculty of the generalized conjugacy search problem. The key
agreement scheme is based on the following Ko-Lee problem. The Ko-Lee problem
is the Diﬃe-Hellman type of a generalized conjugacy search problem.
5. Ko-Lee Problem (KLP)
Instance : The triple (x;y1;y2) of elements in Bl+r such that y1 = axa¡1 and
y2 = bxb¡1 for some hidden a 2 LBl and b 2 RBr.4
Objective : Find by1b¡1(= ay2a¡1 = abxa¡1b¡1). Here, ab = ba for any a 2 LBl
and b 2 RBr.
We say that the computational Ko-Lee assumption if no eﬃcient algorithm
can compute the shared key abxb¡1a¡1. We also say that the decisional Ko-Lee
assumption if it is hard to distinguish the shared key abxb¡1a¡1 from a random
conjugate of x of the form wxw¡1. The GCSP and the computational Ko-Lee
problem have no polynomial-time solving algorithm yet. However, it turns out to
be the decisional Ko-Lee assumption is false [12]. Now we introduce the 2-party
key agreement protocol on braid groups [13].
Key Agreement Protocol :
(i) Preparation step : Suppose A and B want to share a common secret key.
An appropriate pair of integers (l;r) and a suﬃciently complicated (l + r)-braid
® 2 Bl+r is selected and published.
(ii) Key agreement scheme :
(a) A chooses a random secret braid r1 2 LBl and sends y1 = r1®r1
¡1 to B.
(b) B chooses a random secret braid r2 2 RBr and sends y2 = r2®r2
¡1 to A.
(c) A receives y2 and computes the shared key k = r1y2r1
¡1:
(d) B receives y1 and computes the shared key k = r2y1r2
¡1:
Since r1 2 LBl and r2 2 RBr; r1r2 = r2r1. This implies k = r1y2r1
¡1 = r2y1r2
¡1.
Therefore A and B obtain the common secret k.
The security of this protocol is based on the hardness of Ko-Lee problem. The
shared secret key k must be derived by applying a suitable key derivation function
to the quantity r1r2®r¡1
2 r¡1
1 . For otherwise, an attacker might be able to get
partial information about common secret keys even if KLP is hard.
3. Authenticated group key agreement on braid groups
Our interest is to design the authenticated key agreement protocol on braid groups.
This protocol requires the following desirable properties.
¦ Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)
¦ Resistance to Known-Key Attacks
¦ Key Authentication
¦ Key Conﬁrmation and Key Integrity5
All of these are necessary to achieve resistance to active adversaries where an
adversary additionally subverts the communications by injecting, deleting, alter-
ing or replaying messages. We give some deﬁnitions and terminology regarding
authenticated key agreement protocol.
A key agreement protocol is a key establishment technique whereby a shared
secret key is derived by two(or more) parties as a function of information con-
tributed, or associated with, each of these, such that no party can predetermine
the resulting value. A key agreement protocol is contributory if each party equally
contributes to the key and guarantees its freshness. Let A and B be two honest
parties i.e. legitimate who execute the steps of a protocol correctly. A key agree-
ment protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication(of B to A) if the party
A is assured that no other party aside from a specially identiﬁed second party B
can possibly learn the value of a particular secret key. A protocol provides key
conﬁrmation if a party is assured that its peer(or a group thereof) actually has
possession or a particular secret key. A contributory key agreement protocol pro-
vides key integrity if a party is assured that its particular secret key is a function
of only the individual contributions of all protocol parties. In particular, extrane-
ous contribution(s) to the group key cannot be tolerated even if it does not aﬀord
the attacker(s) with any additional knowledge. A key agreement protocol which
provides implicit key authentication to both participating parties is called an au-
thenticated key agreement protocol (A-KA). A protocol is said to have perfect
forward secrecy if compromise of long-term keys does not compromise past session
keys. A protocol is said to be vulnerable to known-key attack if compromise of
past session keys allows either a passive adversary to compromise future session
keys, or an active adversary to impersonate one of the protocol parties.
3.1. Group key agreement protocol
In this subsection we construct the group key agreement(GKA) protocol on braid
groups by extending the 2-party key agreement.
The following notation is used in this section.
n : number of group members
i;j : index of group members6
Mi : i-the group member
Bl : l-th braid group
® : suﬃciently complicated l-braid
xi : long-term secret key of Mi in Bli
ri : random secret key of Mi in Bli
ki;j : long-term common secret key shared by Mi and Mj for i 6= j
Sn : group key shared by all n-members
Sn(Mi) : Mi’s view on a group key
We consider n subgroups Bl1;Bl2;¢¢¢ ;Bln of l-braid group Bl where l = l1 +
l2+¢¢¢+ln for some appropriate integers l1;l2;¢¢¢ ;ln. Each Bli is the subgroup of
Bl consisting of braids made by braiding li-strands from the left among l-strands
with the order l1;l2;¢¢¢ ;ln. Thus each Bli is generated by
< ¾Pi¡1
j=0 lj+1; ¾Pi¡1
j=0 lj+2; ¢¢¢ ; ¾Pi
j=0 lj¡2; ¾Pi
j=0 lj¡1 >
where i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;n and l0 = 0 by convention. For any rm 2 Blm and rn 2 Bln
with m 6= n, rmrn = rnrm. Let ® 2 Bl be a suﬃciently complicated l-braid.
We suppose fMiji = 1;¢¢¢ ;ng is the set of members wishing to share a key. We
construct a shared group key by performing the following steps.
GKA Protocol on Braid groups
Round i; (i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1)
(i) Mi selects a random ri 2 Bli.
(ii) Mi ¡! Mi+1 : fri ¢¢¢ ˆ rj ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
j ¢¢¢r¡1
i j j = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;ig and
riri¡1 ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
i¡1r¡1
i , where ˆ rj means that rj does not appear.
Round n
(i) Mn selects a random rn 2 Bln.
(ii) Mn computes rn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n for each i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1.
Mn ¡! Mi for all i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1 : rn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n .
Then each participant Mi obtains the shared key by computing
Sn(Mi) = ri(rn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n )r¡1
i
= rn ¢¢¢ri+1riri¡1 ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
i¡1r¡1
i r¡1
i+1 ¢¢¢r¡1
n :7
Mn also computes the shared key
Sn(Mn) = rn(rn¡1 ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
n¡1)r¡1
n : ¤
Our protocols are based on distributively computing a subset of fS®S¡1jS ½
fr1;¢¢¢rngg. From rn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢ r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ ri
¡1¢¢¢r¡1
n , each member Mi can easily
computes the shared key Sn = rn ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
n .
3.2. Authenticated group key agreement protocol
In this subsection, we construct the authenticated group key agreement(A-GKA)
protocol on braid groups.
A-GKA Protocol on Braid groups
Initialization : Let ® be a suﬃciently complicated l-braid in Bl and M1;¢¢¢ ;Mn
be n participants wishing to share a key. Each Mi chooses a secret xi 2 Bli and
computes xi®x¡1
i . Let f(xi;xi®x¡1
i )ji = 1;¢¢¢ ;ng be the set of long-term secret
and public keys of M0
is. Thus (l1;¢¢¢ ;ln;®;x1®x¡1
1 ;¢¢¢ ;xn®x¡1
n ) are the public
values of the system.
Round i; (i = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1)
(i) Mi selects a random ri 2 Bli.
(ii) Mi ¡! Mi+1 : fri ¢¢¢ ˆ rj ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
j ¢¢¢r¡1
i j j = 1;2;¢¢¢ ;ig and
riri¡1 ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
i¡1r¡1
i .
Round n
(i) Mn selects a random rn 2 Bln and Mn computes kin = xnxi®x¡1
i x¡1
n for each
i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1.
(ii) Mn ¡! Mi for all i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n¡1 : ¾i = kinrn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n k¡1
in .
When each Mi receives ¾i; compute kin and Sn(Mi) = rik¡1
in ¾ikinr¡1
i . Therefore
the shared key for all Mi is
Sn(Mi) = rik¡1
in ¾ikinr¡1
i
= rirn ¢¢¢ ˆ ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢ ˆ r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n r¡1
i
= rn ¢¢¢ri ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
i ¢¢¢r¡1
n :
Also Mn computes the shared key
Sn(Mn) = rn(rn¡1 ¢¢¢r1®r¡1
1 ¢¢¢r¡1
n¡1)r¡1
n : ¤8
THEOREM 3.1. A-GKA is a contributory authenticated key agreement protocol.
Proof. From the construction of the above protocol, it is evident that the
protocol is contributory. Let C be an active adversary who can modify, delay or
inject messages. The goal of the adversary is to share a key with either Mi for
i 2 f1;:::;n ¡ 1g or Mn by masquerading as some Mi.
Attack on Mn : Let Sn(Mn) be the key computed by Mn and Sn(Mn) =
rncn®c¡1
n r¡1
n where cn is possibly known to C and cnrn = rncn. Computing
rncn®c¡1
n r¡1
n requires C to compute rn®r¡1
n . But the only expression containing
rn®r¡1
n is ¾i = kin(cn
ri )rn®r¡1
n (cn
ri )k¡1
in . Hence it is intractable to compute rn®r¡1
n
without the knowledge of kin for any i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1.
Attack on Mi for some i : Let Sn(Mi) be the key computed by Mi and Sn(Mi) =
rik¡1
in ci®c¡1
i kinr¡1
i where ci is possibly known to C. First, suppose ci = kin¯ ci where
¯ ci is polynomially independent of kin and known to C. Then
Sn(Mi) = rik¡1
in (kin¯ ci®¯ ci
¡1k¡1
in )kinr¡1
i = ri¯ ci®¯ ci
¡1r¡1
i :
However computing kin¯ ci®¯ ci
¡1k¡1
in is intractable without the knowledge of kin.
Therefore it is diﬃcult to compute Sn(Mi). Next, we assume ci is polynomially
independent of kin. Then rik¡1
in ci®ci
¡1kinr¡1
i is still a function of k¡1
in and kin,
hence computing Sn(Mi) is intractable by C. ¤
THEOREM 3.2. A-GKA protocol provides perfect forward security.
Proof. Suppose that all long term keys fkin j i = 1;:::;n¡1g are compromised.
Then the adversary is able to compute a subset of fS®S¡1 j S ½ fr1;r2;¢¢¢ ;rngg
where S®S¡1 means rik ¢¢¢ri1®r¡1
i1 ¢¢¢r¡1
ik for S = fri1;¢¢¢ ;rikg: However, by the
direct extension of 2-party key exchange scheme, it is intractable to ﬁnd the group
key for the given set fS®S¡1 j S ½ fr1;r2;¢¢¢ ;rngg. ¤
THEOREM 3.3. A-GKA is resistant to the known key attacks.
Proof. The protocol A-GKA is resistant to passive known-key attacks since the
session keys do not contain any information of long-term keys. Let Sn(Mi) be the
session key computed by each Mi;Sn(Mi) = rikinci®c¡1
i k¡1
in r¡1
i for i = 1;¢¢¢ ;n¡1
and Sn(Mn) = rncn®c¡1
n r¡1
n where each ci is a quantity possibly known to the
adversary C. C also knows a subset of fS®S¡1jS ½ fr1;¢¢¢ ;rngg: Using these
information, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd kin®k¡1
in or k¡1
in ®kin. Therefore it is resistant to
the active known-key attacks. ¤9
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